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Summary
This article examines politics of memory on the Second World War and its 
aftermath in contemporary Serbia, focusing on the people executed or sen-
tenced after the war and their framing. Discussing the dominant narratives 
and institutional and legal frameworks of official memory politics, the first 
part of the paper is concerned with the dynamics between different mnemonic 
agents, including non-state actors. Namely, commemorations and memorials 
dedicated to victims of communism come from below, from the groups con-
sidering the state efforts in this sphere insufficient. They are, however, sup-
ported by some political actors, the church, and Karađorđević family. Finally, 
the paper looks at the perception of Bleiburg commemorations in media and 
political discourses in Serbia, placing it in the context of relations between 
the two countries concerning the memory of the war and its aftermath. As op-
posed to very similar tendencies in Croatia and Serbia, the political actors are 
concerned with their own victims respectively, framing them as the victims of 
communism. At the same time, the commemorations and rehabilitations hap-
pening in the other country are never acknowledged but condemned.
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In April 2014, an exhibition entitled “In the Name of the People! Political Repres-
sion in Serbia 1944-1953” was opened in the Historical Museum of Serbia in Bel-
grade, supported by the Ministry of Culture. Inspired by the House of Terror in 
Budapest, the exhibition was the first museum representation of the events taking 
place during the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in post-Yugoslav 
Serbia. The exhibition was announced as “the first multimedia exhibition about 
the topics that had been taboo for many years: executions, trials against people’s 
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enemies, Goli Otok and other camps, and forced collectivization”.1 Prior to its 
opening, the exhibition was widely advertised and promoted in Serbian media, in-
cluding the public broadcaster Radio Television of Serbia, representing the exhibi-
tion as revealing the hidden dark side of Serbian history. The author of the exhibi-
tion, the historian Srđan Cvetković, summarized the exhibition as having the goal 
to make “people in the 21st century feel the atmosphere of the repression that was 
implemented first as the imitation of Stalinism and then as totalitarianism in Tito’s 
style”.2 The author’s idea was to turn off electricity at the Nikola Pašić Square in 
front of the museum for the opening where the darkness would illustrate the atmo-
sphere of the post-war terror.
The exhibition symbolizes the depiction of socialist Yugoslavia as the “long 
dark night” of national history which has represented the focal point of the official 
politics of memory in Serbia, particularly in the first decade after the overthrow 
of Slobodan Milošević. The politics of memory on the Yugoslav period are inter-
twined with the memory of the Second World War, as the war represented the site 
of birth and source of legitimacy for post-1945 Yugoslavia. Mnemonic hegemony 
centers on the interpretation of the end of the war and the immediate post-war pe-
riod with the focus on the repression, executions, and trials, rather than liberation. 
This interpretation implies that the construction of the narrative of victims of com-
munism, which is based on the very selective approach to historical events and re-
cords, where all persons who were victims of the “crimes of the liberators” are as-
cribed with the notion of innocence, regardless of their wartime role and activities. 
In this way, those considered collaborators or war criminals have become innocent 
victims of the communist regime and the People’s Liberation War, and the libera-
tion as its outcome has turned into revolutionary terror. The exhibition “In the Name 
of the People” follows this line. The exhibition poster represented the mosaic of the 
photographs of the victims of repression, including Milan Aćimović, the head of 
the Commissary Government, the first quisling government of occupied Serbia, and 
the Minister of Interior in the Government of the National Salvation led by Milan 
Nedić that followed. Furthermore, part of the exhibition was dedicated to Dragoljub 
Mihailović, the leader of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (more commonly re-
ferred to as the Chetnik movement), the royalist army officially representing the ex-
ile-government in London and on the side of the Allies until 1944, at the same time 
1 <www.facebook.com/uimenaroda>, last accessed on 22 January 2017. This is no longer the 
official Facebook page of the exhibition, but of the project and organization that have grown out 
of it.
2 “Srđan Cvetković: Osvetljavamo mračne godine Srbije”, Večernje novosti, 13 October 2013, 
<www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:458560-Srdjan-Cvetkovic-Osvet-
ljavamo-mracne-godine-Srbije>, last accessed on 22 January 2017.
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engaged in the armed conflict against the Partisans, collaboration with the occupa-
tion forces, and mass crimes against the civilian population. The issue of collabora-
tion was not mentioned. Merging civilians as victims of post-war repression with 
the representatives of the collaborationist authorities and armed forces and framing 
them together in the narrative of innocent victims of communism is at the center of 
the historical reinterpretation of the Second World War and the post-war period in 
Serbia since the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000.
The main tendencies in the interpretation of contemporary history as summa-
rized above can be related to contemporary politics of memory in Croatia, where 
Bleiburg represents the most prominent example of commemoration practices. As 
Kamberović explains, all existing models of revisionism of the recent and distant 
past in historiography, public discourses, and media can be noticed in the post-
Yugoslav space, where the revision of the common Yugoslav past is what all post-
Yugoslav countries have in common albeit with different intensities. The purpose 
of the revision of the Yugoslav period is to establish a clear discontinuity with it, 
in order to construct the pre-Yugoslav period in a more favorable way and find the 
historical arguments for strengthening the new nation-states and the ideologies in 
power. Kamberović emphasizes that Serbia and Croatia have gone furthest in that 
process (2007: 12). Similarly, Kuljić tracks the beginning of this process of “ideo-
logical historical revisionism” in former Yugoslavia back to much before the dis-
solution of Yugoslavia, in the revisionist controversies which were part of the Cro-
atian Spring, the Linguistic Debate and the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy 
for Sciences and Arts. The only change which appeared after the dissolution of Yu-
goslavia is that revisionism started to manifest itself more openly in the public and 
became accepted by the newly-founded nation-states. The strong anti-communist 
and anti-totalitarian rhetoric, as a part of this revisionism, is used as a mask to hide 
the “dark periods of history” in an attempt to normalize and justify it (Kuljić, 2002: 
21). In spite of the similarities in the official politics of memory and the interpreta-
tion of the Second World War and Yugoslavia in Serbia and Croatia, the common 
past in both countries has been interpreted in strictly national terms. Together with 
the dissolution of the common state, the Yugoslav regime of memory was broken 
along the national lines, “fragmented and disintegrated” (Höpken, 1999: 206). The 
nationalization of memory implies the focus on one’s own victims within the other-
wise similar mnemonic hegemonies that view the war and socialist Yugoslavia 
through the prism of post-war repression.
 This article provides an overview of the politics of memory on the Second 
World War and the post-war period in contemporary Serbia with the particular fo-
cus on the memory of the Second World War actors who faced extrajudicial execu-
tions or trials in the post-war period. In the first part, the state-sanctioned politics 
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of memory are discussed, examining their main characteristics as well as the insti-
tutional and legal frameworks. The second part is concerned with the wider dyna-
mics of memory politics and collective memory in the Serbian society. The starting 
point for the analysis is the concept of collective memory as defined by Kansteiner, 
which is the interaction of three types of historical factors: the cultural and intellec-
tual traditions that frame our representations of the past, the memory makers who 
selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and memory consumers who use, 
ignore, or transform such artifacts to their own interests (2002: 18). Moving beyond 
the state-oriented top-down approach, politics of memory are understood as “de-
termined by the relations of forces between hegemonic master narratives, defiant 
counter-memories, and silent majorities whose historical experience is rarely articu-
lated in public” (Molden, 2016: 125). Taking these ideas into consideration, poli-
tics of memory in Serbia are examined as dynamics between different mnemonic 
agents. The institutional and legal frameworks offered at the official level do not 
imply the visibility of the reinterpretation of the past in the public space. All com-
memorative practices and monuments marking the sites of memory come from be-
low, from memory consumers who do not feel accommodated by the mechanisms 
of the state-sanctioned politics of memory since the year 2000.
Finally, the paper examines the perspectives on the Bleiburg commemoration 
in media and political discourses in Serbia with an outlook to the wider interactions 
between the two countries regarding the politics of memory on the Second World 
War and the post-war period. I argue that, although there are very similar dominant 
tendencies in both countries, the political actors in both Croatia and Serbia are con-
cerned with their own victims respectively, framing them as the victims of commu-
nism and at the same time not acknowledging, but explicitly condemning the com-
memorations and rehabilitation of people from the other country.
Memory Politics on the Second World War and the Post-war Period in Serbia 
The politics of memory on the Second World War and the post-war period in Serbia 
became strongly institutionalized after the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000. As 
Ramet explains (2011: 3), there were elements of historical revisionism about the 
Second World War during the Milošević era, but the serious debates about the Se-
cond World War among the groups with vested political interest in their outcome 
and the big push for the rehabilitation of collaborators came only after Milošević’s 
fall. The key goal of the coalition of political parties that came to power in 2000 was 
to make a clear cut with the communist past, interpreting Milošević as representing 
the continuity of Yugosla v socialism which would make them the liberators of Ser-
bia from communism (Stojanović, 2010: 17). In the strong anti-communist climate 
of the immediate post-Milošević period, the Second World War became the central 
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object of revision, having represented the site of “the mythical birth of the commu-
nist regime” (ibid.: 13). 
The year 2000 represents the large turn in politics of memory with the formerly 
existing but marginal narratives and interpretations of the Second World War mak-
ing the transfer to the official sphere and becoming the focal point of the mnemonic 
hegemony. However, regarding politics of memory, the period since the overthrow 
of Milošević has not been homogeneous. The strongest strive for the delegitimiza-
tion of everything associated with Yugoslavia and the Second World War narratives 
as the main source of its legitimacy was most evident throughout the first deca-
de, during the dominant presence of the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, 
DS) in the state leadership. This is evident, for instance, in the parliamentary dis-
cussions on the legislation regarding veterans and judicial rehabilitation in 2004, 
2006 and 2011, when the Democratic Party representatives proposed the legisla-
tion, and all voted in favor of it, the only party consistently opposing the laws be-
ing the Socialist Party of Serbia. The current government, with majority composed 
of the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka, SNS), has not intro-
duced any novel formal measures dedicated to the revision of the Second World 
War and state socialism. The issues such as judicial rehabilitation of Milan Nedić 
or Dragoljub Mihailović represent a consequence of the legislation adopted before 
2012. Nevertheless, the attitude of the dominant political actors towards the past has 
not changed drastically. 
I argue that there are three most important explanations of this dynamics in 
memory politics in Serbia. First, it can be argued that the revised interpretation of 
the Second World War and its actors had been established as the official narrative 
before the current government came to power, with the Chetnik movement formally 
and symbolically rehabilitated, hence not many further steps had to be taken in that 
direction. The participation of Oliver Antić, at the time the adviser of the President 
of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić, as a lawyer in the rehabilitation process of Dragoljub 
Mihailović at the very end and his insistence on behalf of the President to complete 
the process as soon as possible contributes to this explanation. It shows that the 
general attitude of the ruling parties towards the Second World War did not change, 
even with the above-mentioned shift to celebrating the victory in the war. Further-
more, the political parties currently dominant in power do not draw their legitimacy 
from the year 2000 and the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević, unlike the Democra-
tic Party and other associated parties for whom the year 2000 represented the most 
important point of reference making them the carriers of democratic transition in 
Serbia. Finally, the current government represents the coalition of the Serbian Pro-
gressive Party with the Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije, SPS) 
and the Movement of Socialists (Pokret socijalista, PS). The Socialist Party of Ser-
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bia is the second strongest party in Serbia, but they were also in the coalition with 
the Democratic Party from 2008 on, its representatives leading several ministries 
and the parliament. Their increasing prominence can be linked to the shift to the 
commemorations of the Partisans, discussed in the paragraph below. Although these 
parties are only nominally socialist and surely cannot be interpreted as leftist, they 
have constantly positioned themselves as the opponents to the initiatives regard-
ing memory politics and rehabilitation during the previous period and promoted 
the narratives of preservation of the antifascist legacy of Serbia in the public. The 
paradox is that the Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO) joined 
the coalition in 2014, the party that emphasizes both their opposition role during the 
1990s and a very strong anti-communist and pro-Chetnik stance and that had also 
been in coalition with the Democratic Party before.3 Additionally, the close rela-
tions to the Russian Federation represent another factor contributing to the apparent 
revival of the commemorations of the liberation and victory in the Second World 
War happening most notably since 2012, to which Stojanović refers to as “the revi-
sion of the revision” (2011: 261).
Tracing the beginning of the process of revising the revision back to 2007, 
Stojanović points out to an important and gradual shift in the relation to the winners 
and the losers of the Second World War most obvious in the revival of the celebra-
tions of the Day of the Liberation of Belgrade. The day was first deleted from the of-
ficial calendar in 2000. However, starting modestly with Boris Tadić laying flowers 
on the Cemetery of Belgrade Liberators and becoming very prominent during the 
celebrations under the slogan “Belgrade remembers” that took place in 2009, the 
official celebrations of the Liberation Day culminated during the visit of Vladimir 
Putin in 2014. An hours-long military parade, “The Victors’ March”, was broad-
cast live on national television and actually held four days before 20 October so 
that the Russian president could attend. In the meantime, these commemorations, 
with a very strong military nature and with an emphasis on the Serbian army, have 
become a regular practice. Moreover, the flags and symbols of Yugoslavia and the 
Partisan units have been increasingly present at the celebrations of Liberation Day 
and other similar occasions involving the state and army support. They have, how-
3 This article was first submitted on 22 January 2017, but it should be noted that a fraction of the 
Serbian Renewal Movement that had been expelled from the party established their own politi-
cal party, the Movement for the Renewal of the Kingdom of Serbia (Pokret obnove Kraljevine 
Srbije, POKS) in July 2017. This is a more radical wing of the SPO that promotes going back to 
the values and goals of the party from the early 1990s, that they believe to have been abandoned. 
Many members of the local government councils joined them, as well as a few members of the 
Vojvodina parliament, and they have one member in the Serbian National Assembly at the mo-
ment of revising the manuscript (May 2018). The party was officially established on the day of 
the execution of Dragoljub Mihailović.
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ever, been deprived of their political meaning and instead serve primarily performa-
tive and decorative purposes. Not only a simple shift to celebrating the Yugoslav 
memory culture based on antifascism, this process represents another aspect of the 
process of the post-Yugoslav nationalization of memory. Comparable to the focus 
on the Serbs as victims of communism, as discussed later in this article, these com-
memorations promote a national narrative that is not only depoliticizing the Yugo-
slav Partisans, but also “de-Yugoslavizing” and blending them into the narrative 
of Serbian antifascism and the Serbian victory in the Second World War. The fact 
that this happens in parallel to state-sponsored historical revisionism about the very 
same historical period illuminates the dynamic, inconsistent and contradictory na-
ture of politics of memory. While understanding the relevance of this aspect of con-
temporary memory politics, this article, however, limits its scope to the discourses 
on victims of communism.
The main characteristics of state-supported historical revisionism in Serbia re-
volve around ignoring the Yugoslav historiography as ideologically manipulated, a 
demonization of socialism, a relativization and discreditation of the People’s Lib-
eration War and Yugoslav antifascism, the normalization of collaboration, and the 
victimization of collaborators who were executed by the Yugoslav Partisans or sen-
tenced at post-war trials (Radanović, 2011: 260). In other words, the politics of 
memory, most notably in the period until 2012, is based on narratives of Serbian 
victimhood under the repression by the Yugoslav communist regime and centers on 
the political and legal rehabilitation of the Chetnik movement as a national resist-
ance movement “who sought to avoid excessive Serbian losses” (Sindbæk, 2009: 
52). The members of the Chetnik movement with their leader Dragoljub Mihailović 
have become a symbol of victimhood. They symbolize the wider tendency of the 
discursive construction of innocent victims of communism by looking at the whole 
Second World War and Yugoslavia through the lens of the post-war trials and exe-
cutions while ignoring the wartime activities of the persons and movements con-
cerned, such as collaboration, crimes against humanity, and persecution of different 
groups within occupied Serbia. The selective approach to and the interpretation of 
the war and the post-war period allows not only the rehabilitation of the Chetniks, 
but more prominent collaborators as well, such as the wartime Prime Minister Mi-
lan Nedić and other representatives of the collaborationist authorities in occupied 
Serbia.
Since the year 2000, Serbian official politics of memory has been promoted 
and most visible within institutional and legal frameworks. A small number of his-
torians have played an important role in these frameworks, serving as expert wit-
nesses in courts and as members of state-funded commissions. Additionally, the 
dominant interpretations of the Second World War and the post-war period have 
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their roots in the works of these historians who represent the minority in the field by 
numbers, but are the most influential and play the role of mnemonic agents as well. 
The first important legal initiative were the changes of the Law on Veterans, War 
Invalids, and Members of their Families adopted in 2004. These officially equalized 
the members of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland and the Ravna Gora move-
ment with the People’s Liberation Movement, granting the veterans of both armed 
movements the same status and rights.4 Moreover, two Rehabilitation Acts were 
adopted in 2006 and 2011, introducing the possibility of legal rehabilitation in court 
for those sentenced, executed, or deprived of any rights or property for political or 
ideological reasons.5 The vague formulation of the laws allows the rehabilitation 
of literally anyone regardless if there was a court or administrative decision prior 
to the execution, a sentence, or any confiscation of property and regardless of the 
wartime activities and responsibility, as long as it can be argued that there are ideo-
logical or political reasons involved. According to these laws, Dragoljub Mihailović 
was rehabilitated in May 2015, the court decision pronouncing his 1946 process 
and sentence incorrect and thus invalid. The rehabilitation of Milan Nedić started in 
December 2015 and is ongoing, as well as the rehabilitation of Nikola Kalabić, the 
commander of the Mountain Guard Corps (Korpus gorske garde), the most notori-
ous Chetnik unit in Serbia, whose process started in 2013. 
The Government of Serbia established two fact finding commissions in 2009, 
one in charge for locating the graves of the people executed in the territory of Ser-
bia after 12 September 1944 and the other dedicated specifically to the investigation 
of the circumstances of the death of Dragoljub Mihailović.6 During the rehabilita-
tion process of Mihailović, the two commissions joined forces in order to look for 
his remains. The search was accompanied by sensationalist media coverage with 
members of the commissions frequently appearing in the media to announce the ex-
pected discoveries. However, the commission did not discover any significant new 
4 “Zakon o pravima boraca, ratnih invalida i članova njihovih porodica”, Službeni glasnik Re-
publike Srbije, 137/2004. It has to be noted that the significance of the law is that it equalized 
both movements nominally and symbolically, officially interpreting the Chetnik movement as 
antifascist and equal to the Partisans. However, its practical implementation regarding pensions 
was not fulfilled, because no Chetnik veteran has been approved the pension until now.
5 “Zakon o rehabilitaciji”, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, 33/06 and 92/2011.
6 Officially: The State Commission for the Secret Graves of Those Executed after 12 Septem-
ber 1944 (Državna komisija za tajne grobnice ubijenih posle 12. septembra 1944) and the Go-
vernment Commission for Investigating the Circumstances of the Death of Dragoljub Mihailović 
(Državna komisija za utvrđivanje okolnosti smrti Dragoljuba Mihailovića). Before they merged 
in the search for Mihailović’s remains, the Mihailović commission which consisted predomi-
nantly of historians focused on archival research.
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information about the site of the execution or burial of Mihailović. The State Com-
mission for the Secret Graves of Those Executed after 12 September 1944 (further: 
The Commission for the Secret Graves) had a mandate to “research, find, and mark 
all secret graves containing the remains of those executed after 12 September 1944” 
and to “locate and mark all grave sites and determine the exact number of those exe-
cuted after September 1944”.7 The results of the Commission are available in an 
online database titled “The Open Book” which encompasses 59,554 names for the 
whole territory of the Republic of Serbia.8
The explicit goal of the Commission for the Secret Graves was to find and 
mark the grave sites and compose the list of those executed as opposed to those 
killed while fighting or disappeared, as it is stated in the name of the commission. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the Commission did not include any evaluation of the 
people killed after the liberation, but rather investigation in order to achieve factual 
knowledge about the numbers of people who lost their lives in Serbia. However, 
the database includes numerous cases of persons who lost their lives while fighting 
in armed forces, missing persons, as well as those, especially ethnic Germans from 
Vojvodina, who died in camps and were not killed directly. Moreover, some mem-
bers of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland who might have lost their lives while 
retreating and fighting against the Partisans in Bosnia are included in the list. Addi-
tionally, similarly to other mechanisms of memory politics related to this period, the 
work of the Commission and its representation in the media, also by the members 
themselves, attached the notion of innocence to people executed, indirectly repre-
senting them as the innocent victims of communism. The database allows for com-
ments on each entry. However, there are no comments for persons who had been 
responsible for war crimes directly or by command responsibility.9 It has to be noted 
that it is a very difficult task to determine whether someone was innocent, or their 
persecution or execution can be justified. This was the response given by the Com-
mission’s secretary Srđan Cvetković when confronted with the issue of innocence, 
also stating that the task of the Commission was not to judge but just to list victims 
and grave sites.10 However, the media appearances and academic publications of 
Cvetković and other members of the Commission leave out this problem and rather 
create the impression that all the victims were innocent victims of communism, exe-
cuted for ideological and political reasons. 
7 <http://www.komisija1944.mpravde.gov.rs/lt/articles/o-nama/>, last accessed on 2 May 2018.
8 <http://www.otvorenaknjiga.komisija1944.mpravde.gov.rs/>, last accessed on 20 January 2017.
9 For a detailed analysis of the contradictions and flaws in the Commission database as well as 
the problems with the total number of victims, see Radanović, 2015: 546-598.
10 Interview with Srđan Cvetković, Belgrade, March 2016.
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The outcome of the work of the Commission for the Secret Graves had a very 
positive effect in the context of debates and number games about the post-war exe-
cutions and the structure of the victims. The dominant narrative promoted by seve-
ral historians and publicists in Serbia, present in media discourses as well, included 
exaggerated numbers up to 300,000 persons executed and the claims that the Ser-
bian population, most notably in central parts of Serbia, was the largest victim of 
the post-war executions. This was the view promoted in publications by historians 
who worked in the Commission as well. Furthermore, the claims that the Chetnik 
movement was completely physically destroyed by the Partisans and Yugoslav au-
thorities have been a common place in numerous publications. The Commission 
results proved these claims wrong. First, the current number of victims is lower 
than 60,000, out of which 68,85% came from Vojvodina and were by majority Ger-
man or Hungarian. The territory of Serbia without Vojvodina and Kosovo covers 
27,59% or 25,219 persons.11 The Germans from Vojvodina cover the largest ethnic 
group and Serbs in whole Serbia make up 26,30% of all listed persons. The study 
conducted by Radanović revealed that more than seven thousand persons listed in 
the database in 2014 were members of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, which 
comprises 49,07% out of all victims in central Serbia. Taking into account that the 
Yugoslav Army in the Homeland had around 25,000 members in August 1944 ac-
cording to the German documents, it is evident that the majority of the Chetnik 
movement from Serbia survived the war and the post-war period (Radanović, 2015: 
595). Around one half of the Chetniks switched to the Partisan side in Summer 1944 
when the Allies decided to give their support to the Partisans, while amnesty was of-
fered to those who had not committed war crimes. Based on the Commission data, 
it can also be concluded that civilians did not represent a majority of those executed 
within Serbia, because members of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland and other 
armed forces covered more than a half of the Serbian victims. 
As opposed to the results of the Commission for the Secret Graves, its mem-
bers, most notably Srđan Cvetković who is the main media representative of the 
Commission, still insist on similar arguments as before the Commission’s list had 
been created. In his latest publication, Cvetković provided the analysis of the struc-
ture of the victims, arguing that most of the victims had been civilians and that the 
primary targets had been members of urban citizenry, critical intelligentsia, politi-
cians, merchants, clerks, factory owners, priests, and wealthier peasants (2016). 
This argument is directly contradicting the results of the research he coordinated, 
but fits the wider tendency of the interpretation of the post-war executions and tri-
11 The numbers and percentage represented in this paragraph are based on the database as it was 
in 2014, when it encompassed 56,147 persons.
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als. This interpretation is focused on the destruction of the political, economic, and 
intellectual elites and wealthier peasants which have become central to the revision-
ist historiography and para-historiography in Serbia. The issue of collaboration and 
other wartime activities of those executed or sentenced is never openly mentioned 
in these discourses, but rather framed as “those accused of collaboration” or “de-
signated as sympathizers, collaborators and people’s enemies” (ibid.: 86-88). When 
interpreted in this way, the members of the Chetnik movement or the repressive ap-
paratus of the Milan Nedić authorities become the victims persecuted as class ene-
mies for solely ideological reasons. Additionally, ignoring the fact that most of the 
victims were members of armed forces and framing them as civilians supports the 
dominant narrative of the innocent victims of communism which again constitutes 
a central narrative of politics of memory in contemporary Serbia.
Memory Consumers and Politics of Memory in the Public Space
Although the state has invested many efforts in the field of memory politics direct-
ed at the separation from and delegitimization of socialist Yugoslavia and its main 
mnemonic narratives about the Second World War, which include addressing those 
considered as victims of communism through the possibility of rehabilitation and 
return of confiscated or nationalized property, no official commemorations or me-
morials dedicated to victims of communism have followed. The exception to this 
are street names but, although thousands of streets that used to commemorate the 
People’s Liberation War have been renamed, there is no tendency of replacing the 
names with the names related to the Chetnik movement or other collaborationist 
forces of the Second World War. The commemorations explicitly dedicated to the 
Chetnik movement and other groups considered victims of communism as well as 
memorials in Serbia are not state-supported but are bottom-up initiatives by differ-
ent groups of citizens or political parties. In other words, commemorative activities 
and memorial places usually come from below. The Association of Victims of Com-
munism and Political Prisoners and the SPO represent the most prominent mne-
monic agents in these initiatives. Furthermore, the commemorations and memorials 
are supported or attended by the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
and the Karađorđević family, most notably by Aleksandar Karađorđević, the son of 
King Petar II. Thus, the main actors in this sphere of politics of memory are not in 
positions of power, but they have the support of the carriers of significant symbolic 
power in the Serbian society.
The event, that by its significance for contemporary politics of memory would 
be comparable to Bleiburg, in Serbia would be the Battle of Zelengora in Bosnia 
in May 1945 which represents the final defeat of the Chetnik movement. The num-
ber of the Chetniks killed at Zelengora has been the object of debates, where his-
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torians sympathizing with the Chetniks of Dragoljub Mihailović claim that more 
than 9,000 Chetniks were killed there, although the available sources prove that no 
more than 3,000-3,500 Chetniks managed to get near Zelengora, with the difficulty 
to precisely determine how many of them were captured, killed while fighting, or 
escaped. The discrepancy in numbers is the result of the interpretation which iden-
tifies the total presence of the different Chetnik units in the wider Bosnian area as 
all killed in the battle or as prisoners of the Partisans afterwards. In spite of the im-
portance that Zelengora has been ascribed to in some historiographical and other 
publications, the battle has nevertheless not become a relevant site of memory.12 
Instead, the central commemoration in Serbia related to the Chetnik movement is 
the Ravna Gora Gathering (Ravnogorski sabor) that takes place in mid-May every 
year at the mountain of Ravna Gora, celebrating the anniversary of 13 May 1941 
when Dragoljub Mihailović gathered the officers and formed the Yugoslav Army 
in the Homeland. It has been held there since May 1990 with the SPO erecting 
a monument to Dragoljub Mihailović and the memorial church at the site in the 
1990s. 
The commemoration at Ravna Gora revolves around the interpretation of 13 
May 1941 as the beginning of the uprising of the Chetniks against the occupa-
tion, framing them as the first anti-occupation guerrilla in Europe. Although the 
commemoration takes place in the same week as the anniversary of the Battle of 
Zelengora, Zelengora does not represent a significant point of reference in the com-
memoration speeches. The Ravnogorski sabor focuses more on the celebration of 
the Chetnik movement and “the occasion of the anniversary of the organized guer-
rilla resistance of the Yugoslav Army and Ravna Gora movement against the Nazi 
occupiers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia”.13 The fallen Chetnik fighters are com-
memorated by a memorial service in a church with the event emphasizing the na-
ture of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland as a resistance movement, while their 
victimhood at the end of the war remains in the background. Besides the SPO and 
the Chetnik veteran association as the main organizers, the commemoration is sup-
ported by the Serbian Orthodox Church, Karađorđević family and the Kingdom of 
Serbia association. 
The Republic of Serbia has not introduced any official holiday commemorat-
ing the victims of post-war executions and trials or the armed forces such as the 
12 The commemorations and memorials to the Chetnik movement are more prominent in Re-
publika Srpska than in Serbia, but the scope of this chapter is limited to the Republic of Serbia 
and the Chetniks of Dragoljub Mihailović without reference to different Chetnik revivals of the 
1990s in the form of paramilitary groups.
13 “Sabor na Ravnoj Gori 10. maja”, Blic, 7 May 2014, <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/sabor-
na-ravnoj-gori-10-maja/y5g1xpn>, last accessed on 21 January 2017.
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Chetnik movement. The gathering at Ravna Gora was officially supported and fi-
nanced by the Ministry of Culture and the Government of Serbia only in 2005, 
when the Minister of Culture was from the SPO political party, but 13 May has not 
become an official holiday in Serbia. The changes in the official calendar of public 
holidays since 2000 were rather in removing the most important dates related to the 
People’s Liberation War, such as the Day of the Uprising and the Day of the Libe-
ration of Belgrade. However, similarly to the street names, they were not replaced 
by new holidays. The commemorations of the day of the execution of Dragoljub 
Mihailović in 1946 are held in July every year at several locations, usually in the 
form of a religious memorial service in churches, with the largest service held in 
the Saint Sava Temple in Belgrade. When Government representatives attend these 
events, it is usually by officials from the SPO party and rarely by individuals from 
other political parties. Furthermore, the Association of Victims of Communism and 
Political Prisoners, in cooperation with the Serbian Orthodox Church, organizes 
memorial services for victims of communism in general, which are also not sup-
ported by the state in any way.
Prior to the 2014 military parade celebrating the liberation of Belgrade, Oli-
ver Antić, the advisor of Tomislav Nikolić and the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the process 
of rehabilitation of Dragoljub Mihailović, advocated the idea of incorporating all 
victims of the antifascist struggle in the parade, regardless of their ideological af-
filiation. He was particularly in favor of the Chetnik symbols and flags alongside 
the Partisans’ but justified the rejection of this idea as having to do with Mihailović 
not being rehabilitated yet, expecting that the Chetniks would be present at some 
future parades.14 This has not happened. Besides occasional support of the state of-
ficials to the Chetnik commemorations such as in 2005, the Chetnik movement has 
not been directly incorporated into the commemorative aspect of official politics of 
memory, including the most recent period and the shift towards the commemora-
tions of the People’s Liberation War.15 Nevertheless, both Boris Tadić and Alek-
sandar Vučić have indirectly supported the idea of two Serbian resistance move-
ments in their commemoration speeches.
Similarly to the official holidays and commemorations, the politics of memory 
on the Second World War and the post-war period in Serbia do not include the con-
14 “Antić: Pravedno da obeležja četnika budu na paradi”, Danas, 2 October 2014, < https://
www.danas.rs/drustvo/antic-pravedno-da-obelezja-cetnika-budu-na-paradi/>, last accessed on 
26 May 2018.
15 In May 2018, a photo of a group of uniformed men of the Serbian army laying flowers at the 
monument of Dragoljub Mihailović on Ravna Gora appeared on social networks. This caused a 
significant public attention, but the Ministry of Defence issued the official statement claiming it 
had not been an official army delegation.
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struction of monuments. Nevertheless, there are numerous memorials dedicated to 
the Chetnik movement and persons executed in the post-war period in Serbia.16 All 
of these memorials come from below and are initiated and financed by local people, 
family members or sympathizers of the Chetnik movement, usually with the sup-
port of the SPO or the Serbian Orthodox Church. For instance, the first monument 
to Dragoljub Mihailović was built in February 1992 at a private property in a village 
between Šabac and Valjevo, at Ravna Gora soon afterwards and also in several other 
towns in Serbia. The monuments commemorating the persons executed at the end 
of the Second World War, who were very often members of the Chetnik movement, 
are usually placed at cemeteries or church yards. An interesting case is the memo-
rial church of Saint Petka in Šabac, which is officially dedicated to “the victims of 
communist terror” and was built in 2006 on the initiative of local groups of citizens 
and holds a memorial service for the citizens of Šabac executed in 1944 every year. 
Additionally, individuals or groups also create and put up commemorative plaques 
at the sites of executions or imprisonments.
The interviews conducted with members of the Association of Victims of Com-
munism, SPO officials, and local actors from Šabac, reveal that these groups see the 
recognition in public space in form of a memorial as most relevant. The 2004 recog-
nition of Chetnik veterans as equal to Partisans and the possibility of legal rehabili-
tation are perceived as a step towards coming to terms with the totalitarian past, but 
deemed as not sufficient. A memorial to victims of communism at a central location 
in Belgrade is perceived as the most important goal. Because of the lack of initia-
tive by the state institutions regarding monuments, some of the groups, most nota-
bly the Association of Victims of Communism and the Chetnik veteran association, 
have submitted requests to the Commission for Monuments and Names of Streets 
and Squares of Belgrade. The Commission has not approved them until now. The 
Chetnik veteran association strives for a memorial to Dragoljub Mihailović at Ada 
Ciganlija in Belgrade as well, where he was probably executed.
16 In Vojvodina, there are marked sites of memory where ethnic Germans and Hungarians were 
held in camps or were executed. Many of those, such as the execution site in Bački Jarak near 
Novi Sad, the memorial plaque in Apatin, the memorial to Germans in Gakovo near Sombor and 
at the cemetery in Sremska Mitrovica, are marked and commemorated by the associations of 
Vojvodina Germans, often supported by the local municipality but without the official govern-
mental support of Vojvodina or Serbia. The exception is the memorial to Hungarian victims in 
Čurug, where both the President of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić and the President of 
Hungary Janos Ader attended the unveiling ceremony in 2013.
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Perspectives on Bleiburg in the Serbian Media and Political Discourses
The process of “nationalizing memory” in both Serbia and Croatia started in the 
1980s (Höpken, 1999: 206). During the 1990s, there was a strong urge to rescue 
Croatian or Serbian identity from the perceived threat of the Yugoslav one and com-
munist crimes were utilized for nationalist mobilization purposes from the 1990s 
onward (Subotić, 2014: 191). The issue of communist crimes and dealing with them 
was largely hijacked by the nationalist elites and far right which is an important 
factor for the dynamics between Serbia and Croatia concerning the memory of the 
Second World War and Yugoslavia. Another important factor is the return of the po-
litical and media actors from the Milošević era and their dominance in the public 
sphere in Serbia. 
Reflecting the state-supported memory politics, the dominant media discourses 
related to the end of the Second World War and the post-war period in contemporary 
Serbia are centered on the repression and the executions in Serbia itself or affecting 
Serbs. Bleiburg is generally considered either a Croatian commemoration or a proof 
of the Ustasha revival and historical revisionism in Croatia. It is mentioned in the 
Serbian press rarely, occupying headlines only on the occasion of the commemora-
tion. Moreover, there are almost no public reactions or comments on the commemo-
ration coming from politicians and state officials. As opposed to that, the processes 
of legal rehabilitation, such as Dragoljub Mihailović in Serbia in 2015 and of Aloj-
zije Stepinac in Croatia in 2016, provoke public reactions in both countries.
In general, when reporting about the Bleiburg commemoration, Serbian main-
stream daily newspapers normally publish news agency reports or public statements 
of non-governmental organizations and persons. This practice implies that there is 
no editorial or author’s intervention in the text, and that reports and statements are 
published in their original form. If there is any opinion or criticism towards the 
commemorations, it is predominantly expressed within the original news agency 
report or statement, representing the supporting or critical voices from Croatia, usu-
ally all newspapers repeating the same content. On the other hand, some of the me-
dia, most notably one of the most read newspapers Večernje novosti, have adopted 
the practice of adding sensationalist headlines which reflect their view on the com-
memorations.17 These headlines are followed by the original news agency content. 
17 Some of them include, but are not limited to: “Croats do not want to end the war against 
Serbs”, “New Ustaša provocation”, “Is the notorious year 1941 making a big comeback in Cro-
atia?”, “Ustaše go wild in Bleiburg”, “Ustaša rampage in Srb”. These headlines are all taken only 
from Večernje novosti as examples. While other mainstream daily newspapers have more neutral 
headlines for the news agency reports on Bleiburg, the printed and online tabloids use stronger 
and more extreme language, often using the term “Ustaša” when referring to Croatia and Croats 
in general.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2018, pp. 89-110
104
The fact that particularly Večernje novosti represents the newspaper with the 
clearly expressed negative view on Bleiburg reflects the wider tendency in which 
Serbian victims, regardless of their wartime activities, are framed as innocent vic-
tims of communism while those commemorated in Bleiburg or Slovenia are the 
Ustasha and always explicitly marked as quislings, fascists, and war criminals.18 
Regarding the memory of the post-war period, Večernje novosti is a very clearly po-
sitioned newspaper that gives significant space to topics related to those understood 
as victims of communism, including the rehabilitation and restitution processes. 
Their style of reporting is based on personal stories and testimonies of those consi-
dered as victims and their families. Their stories are approached in a very warm and 
tragic way, representing the persons in question as innocent victims and strongly 
condemning the Yugoslav regime. Večernje novosti is an example of a wider ten-
dency in print media, such as Blic and Glas javnosti, where the “human story” is 
used as a bait for readers (Lazić, 2011: 272). During the process of rehabilitation 
of Mihailović, Novosti regularly published stories about him from a very personal 
or family perspective with the reporters visiting his birthplace and the family house 
and publishing the letters from his daughter Gordana. Furthermore, five feuilletons 
about Mihailović were published from 2009 to 2015. The testimonies of his com-
batants and daughter as well as the feuilletons that included the phrases such as “the 
martyr” or “tragic person of Serbian history” in the headlines had a goal of bringing 
Mihailović closer to the readership and perpetuating the image of him as a victim. 
Moreover, Večernje novosti is the newspaper that can be understood as a mne-
monic agent besides its role as a medium. In 2009, the series of texts under the title 
“Unearthing the Truth” was published in cooperation with the Institute of Contem-
porary History, encompassing the month-long everyday publication of the lists of 
the secret graves and victims of the Yugoslav regime in Serbia, followed by testi-
monies and confessions of the victims and their descendants. This action was fol-
lowed by a roundtable discussion with the same title organized by Večernje novosti, 
where the newspaper representatives, together with the above-mentioned institute, 
participated with the government officials. The outcome of the roundtable was the 
submitted request for the establishment of an investigative commission for secret 
graves, which was finally established in the same year. The reaction of the state and 
the establishment of the commission represented the main goals of the initiative, 
which was confirmed by the newspaper later: “We managed to upset the public and 
18 What is also important is that two media actors well known for their warmongering role in 
the 1990s have been editors in chief of Večernje novosti since 2013 – first Ratko Dmitrović and 
then Milorad Vučelić since 2017 (the director of Radio Television Serbia and vice-president of 
the Socialist Party of Serbia during the period of Milošević’s rule and the wars of the Yugoslav 
dissolution).
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practically force the state to form the commission for investigating secret graves of 
victims of the communist terror. The goal of the action was to reveal the truth that 
would cause the historical reconciliation of Serbs and the rehabilitation of those 
executed.”19
When reporting about those executed by the Yugoslav Partisans or sentenced in 
the immediate post-war period, the focus of Večernje novosti is on their victimhood 
and suffering of their families during Yugoslavia. The issues such as collaboration 
are always left out, also when it comes to the more prominent individuals such as 
Dragoljub Mihailović or Milan Nedić. As opposed to that, when a member of the 
Ustaša movement is rehabilitated in Serbia, such as in the case of Petar Holjac who 
was executed after the liberation of Zemun in 1944 and whose property was also 
confiscated, their collaboration or participation in the occupation is not left out, but 
rather emphasized. In the case of Holjac’s rehabilitation in 2016, the article was il-
lustrated with the scanned archival document confirming his membership in the 
Ustaša movement and a photo of him on a military parade in Zemun, clearly empha-
sizing that he was a representative of the occupation regime.20 A critical approach 
towards rehabilitation by the authors of the articles themselves, such as in this case, 
is not typical for the media paradigm in Serbia in general. Besides the articles on 
people from Serbia, the Chetnik units from Montenegro who were handed over to 
the Yugoslav authorities by the Allied forces in 1945 in Austria and executed in 
Slovenia are a prominent topic with a focus on their suffering. Nevertheless, while 
framing everyone as an innocent victim of communism, the commemorations of the 
Ustaša are strongly condemned and framed as an example of the wider process of 
rehabilitation of fascism in Croatia. The crimes of the Ustaša movement are always 
in the focus and Večernje novosti constantly emphasizes that no one speaking at the 
commemoration mentions the crimes in their speech.
The information whether the Croatian Government and the Parliament sup-
port the Bleiburg commemoration institutionally or financially is framed to be 
very important and can be found in all reports or articles about Bleiburg in Serbia. 
Furthermore, Serbian media put an emphasis on the politicians and state officials 
who attend the commemoration. The fact that “even” Franjo Tuđman never visited 
Bleiburg as opposed to the political leadership afterwards is very strongly empha-
sized, especially since Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović became the President of Croatia 
19 “Rehabilitacija, pa pomirenje”, Večernje Novosti, 28 January 2011, <http://www.novosti.rs/
vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.69.html:315594-Rehabilitacija-pa-pomirenje>, last accessed on 6 Janu-
ary 2017.
20 “Sud rehabilitovao Ustašu!”, Večernje novosti, 26 March 2016, <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/
naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:597424-Sud-rehabilitovao-ustasu>, last accessed on 8 Jan-
uary 2017.
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in early 2015. Furthermore, the assumption was that there would be significant 
criticism in the Serbian public towards the political and institutional support for the 
Bleiburg commemoration in Croatia. However, it can be concluded that Serbian 
politicians and state officials generally avoid commenting on it. The exception to 
this tendency is Aleksandar Vulin, the Minister of Labor, Employment, Veteran and 
Social Policy in the Government of Serbia from 2014 and Minister of Defense since 
2017, who has issued numerous statements related to the memorialization of the 
Second World War in Croatia. His statements, which are always published in all me-
dia in the original form and without a comment, condemn the Bleiburg commemo-
ration and the state support for it, constantly warning about the “fascization as a part 
of the official policy of the Croatian state”.21 After the 2016 commemoration, Vulin 
issued the statement calling for the European Union to react on the Croatian politi-
cal leadership paying respect to the executed Ustaša, adding that Serbia “would not 
watch quietly while ‘Ustashdom’ (ustaštvo) was born, developing, and growing”.22
As opposed to that, court rehabilitations in both countries seem to provoke 
more significant negative reactions and debates. The rehabilitation of Dragoljub 
Mihailović sparked reactions from Croatia in 2012 which were then answered from 
Serbia and revolved around the narrative that politicians from Croatia had no right 
to criticize because the Ustaša had been completely rehabilitated there already in 
the 1990s, representing the main foundation of the Croatian state today.23 A simi-
lar tendency was present in the public when Alojzije Stepinac was rehabilitated in 
Zagreb in July 2016. The Serbian newspaper headlines deemed the rehabilitation 
of Stepinac as “shameful” and “scandalous”, while several government officials 
and political parties issued statements condemning the rehabilitation outcome and 
ascribing it the larger significance as the rehabilitation of the Ustaša movement 
and the Independent State of Croatia as a whole. In this way, the Serbian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dačić interpreted the rehabilitation of Stepinac as the re-
habilitation of the “fascist Ustaša Independent State of Croatia”, similarly to Alek-
sandar Vulin who called it the rehabilitation of fascist politics which legitimized the 
21 “Vulin: Fašizacija je deo zvanične politike Hrvatske”, Blic, 4 August 2016, <http://www.blic.
rs/vesti/politika/vulin-fasizacija-je-deo-zvanicne-politike-hrvatske/sg9r3tj>, last accessed on 9 
January 2017.
22 “Vulin: EU da kazni Hrvatsku zbog Blajburga”, Blic, 15 May 2016, <http://www.blic.rs/
vesti/politika/vulin-eu-da-kazni-hrvatsku-zbog-blajburga/zgbcsbc>, last accessed on 9 January 
2017.
23 For an example of this debate in 2012, see “Rehabilitacija Draže: Hrvati spremni samo na 
mržnju”, Večernje novosti, 31 March 2012, <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.290.
html:373403-Rehabilitacija-Draze-Hrvati-spremni-samo-za-mrznju>, last accessed on 8 Janu-
ary 2017.
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crimes committed in Jasenovac and the Ustaša movement and the state in general.24 
Besides the tendency to interpret the rehabilitation of Stepinac as the rehabilitation 
of the Ustaša state and fascism, the court decision was also commented on in the 
correlation with Serbia, either interpreting Serbia as having preserved the legacy of 
antifascism unlike Croatia or, more rarely, linking the Stepinac rehabilitation to the 
ongoing rehabilitation processes in Serbia and criticizing both.25 
Although Bleiburg does not represent a prominent topic in the Serbian media, 
there is nevertheless a media paradigm in reporting about its commemoration as 
well as other cases of the memorialization of anything related to the Independent 
State of Croatia. This paradigm has a few main characteristics. First, the practice of 
media reporting reflects the politics of memory in Serbia where the persons framed 
as the victims of communism in Serbia and those from Croatia who faced post-war 
executions and trials are perceived as two completely separate issues, regardless 
of the same regime that is in both cases perceived as a perpetrator. Second and in 
relation to the previous point, when reporting about Bleiburg, rehabilitations, and 
memory of the Second World War and socialist Yugoslavia in Croatia in general, 
Serbian media as well as public officials usually do not refer to Serbia in the same 
context, where very similar narratives about contemporary history are promoted 
and dominate the mnemonic space. This relates to the paradox of the perception 
of the common past of two countries as separated in the dominant media and po-
litical discourses. The same media or persons which are strongly condemning the 
commemorations, pension legislation, or rehabilitation in Croatia are at the same 
time discussing similar tendencies in Serbia in a neutral or positive way, very of-
ten framing it in the narrative of coming to terms with the authoritarian past. The 
rehabilitation is usually not reflected upon and brought into correlation, except in 
the case of the rehabilitation of Mihailović and the debates surrounding it in 2012, 
when the proponents of his rehabilitation emphasized the difference between the 
Ustaše and the Chetniks in order to justify the Chetnik rehabilitation. Third, many 
of the newspaper articles and public statements refer to Serbia as preserving the 
24 “Stepincu oprost zločina”, Večernje novosti, 22 July 2016, <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/pla-
neta.300.html:616266-SRAMOTA-Rehabilitovan-Alojzije-Stepinac>, last accessed on 9 Janu-
ary 2017; “Vulin: Rehabilitacija fašističke politike”, Politika, 23 July 2016, <http://www.poli-
tika.rs/scc/clanak/359724/Vulin-Rehabilitacija-fasisticke-politike>, last accessed on 9 January 
2017.
25 See: “Vucic: Croatia’s Stepinac Ruling Says More About Croatia than Serbs and Serbia”, Be-
ta, 24 July 2016, <http://beta.rs/vesti/vesti-politika/37611-vucic-croatias-stepinac-ruling-says-
more-about-croatia-than-serbs-and-serbia>, last accessed on 9 January 2017; “LSV: Poništavanje 
presude Stepincu zaslužuje najoštriju osudu kao i rehabilitacija Draže Mihailovića”, NSPM, 22 
July 2016, <http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/lsv-ponistavanje-presude-stepincu-zasluzuje-najostri-
ju-osudu-kao-i-rehabilitacija-draze-mihailovica.html>, last accessed on 9 January 2017.
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Yugoslav legacy, while Croatia is seen as striving for erasing its Yugoslav past and 
rehabilitation of fascism.26 Finally, Bleiburg is very often confronted with the nexus 
of the Jasenovac concentration camp and the Serbian victimhood under the Ustaša 
regime, in which case the commemoration in Bleiburg is interpreted and criticized 
as the relativization of Ustaša crimes and the equation of the victims of Jasenovac 
and Bleiburg as an equation of victims and perpetrators.
Concluding Remarks
The state-funded politics of memory on the Second World War and the post-war 
period in Serbia since 2000 have revolved around the separation from the Yugoslav 
memory culture and its main narratives, where the Second World War and more im-
portantly the People’s Liberation War represented the main legitimacy foundation 
for socialist Yugoslavia. The Partisan narrative was first replaced by the narratives 
of victimhood under the communist regime that went hand in hand with the positive 
reinterpretation of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland. The Chetnik movement 
and their rehabilitation became the central point of politics of memory, framed pa-
rallelly as both the symbol of the Serbian victimhood in the post-war period in Yu-
goslavia and as the national resistance movement not led by the Communist Party. 
The institutional and legal frameworks of the politics of memory in Serbia center on 
the recognition and accommodation of those considered as victims of communism. 
However, this tendency implies the idea of innocence attached to all persons perse-
cuted in the post-war period regardless of other grounds for their persecution other 
than political and ideological reasons. The problem of collaboration and war crimes 
among the members of different armed forces and representatives of the quisling 
government of occupied Serbia are left out, selectively interpreting the war and the 
post-war period and equating all persons as innocent victims of communism. In 
parallel to this process, there has been a gradual shift to the commemorations of the 
People’s Liberation War and the victory against fascism in particular, however, in-
terpreted in strictly national terms and taken out of its ideological context.
26 In a very thorough overview of the street names and monuments commemorating the Yugoslav 
period in the post-Yugoslav space, originally published in Večernje novosti in January 2016, but 
afterwards further distributed in other printed and online media, Serbia is used as an example of 
the state that preserved most of the street names from Yugoslavia. The critique centres on the argu-
ment that most of the street names referring to Serbia have been renamed in Croatia, while there 
are still hundreds of streets in Belgrade carrying the names referring to the People’s Liberation 
War but also to persons from Croatia and other former Yugoslav republics. The two big waves of 
street renaming in Serbia (especially in Belgrade) in 1997 and in the immediate post-2000 period 
are not mentioned. See: “Tito u eks-ju opstaje, a sve srpsko brišu”, Večernje novosti, 17 January 
2016, <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html%3A586449-Tito-u-eks-
ju—opstaje-a-sve--srpsko-brisu>, last accessed on 11 January 2017.
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The official politics of memory regarding victims of communism remains in-
visible in the state-sponsored commemorative and monumental landscape and the 
official calendar. The commemorations of the victims of communism as well as 
memorials dedicated to them are all the results of the initiatives of different groups, 
sometimes in cooperation with local authorities. They could be understood as com-
ing from below, although they have support of the Serbian Orthodox Church and 
Karađorđević family which gives the acts of commemoration more symbolical 
power. Because of the lack of state support, the groups with personal or political 
interest in commemorating victims of communism do not feel recognized and ad-
dressed sufficiently.
The analysis of the public discourses about the Bleiburg commemoration in 
Serbia supports the argument that the national fragmentation of memory in the post-
Yugoslav space resulted in competitive and separate national memory cultures in 
Serbia and Croatia. In each state, the focus of the official politics of memory and 
mnemonic practices is focused on the persons perceived as victims who belong to 
each nation respectively, while the same tendency in the other country is strongly 
condemned as rehabilitation of war criminals or fascists. Although the mnemonic 
hegemony in both Serbia and Croatia shares the similar negative interpretation of 
the common Yugoslav past with the focus on the Partisans and Yugoslav authorities 
as criminal, the memory cultures remain mutually exclusive. 
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